Trade Returns? | 28th April 2014
Why Obama was wrong to leave Japan without a deal | There is little doubt that President Obamaâs visit toÂ Asia was all about trade. The TransPacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations aim to enhance trade, economicÂ integration and growth across the Asia-Pacific region particularly through the establishment of a free tradeÂ area (FTA) between the participants. That President Obama left Japan without an agreement is significantÂ for the future of the TPP and his warnings to South Korea about its treatment of US exporters did nothing toÂ reassure markets that the agreement was any closer.
However, at first glance, the relationship between inter-regional tradeÂ and key Asian markets and currencies would suggest that there is littleÂ for markets to be concerned about. US exports to and US imports fromÂ key countries within the region are strongly and negatively correlatedÂ with the Hang Seng Index (all above -0.72) and with the S&P 500 (again,Â all above -0.55). Similarly, Indonesiaâs trade with the US is mildly butÂ negatively correlated with the Rupiahâs value against the US dollar andÂ Indiaâs trade is mildly but again negatively correlated with the valueÂ against the US dollar of the Rupee. The only exception is Thailand: itsÂ exports to the US are highly and positively correlated with the BhatâsÂ value against the US dollar at 0.85.
If the links are so weak with currencies and strong but negative with key markets, why attempt to build a FreeÂ Trade Area? The conclusion from these largely negative correlations must surely be that Asia-Pacific is betterÂ served by intra-regional trade. The US, in this context has more to gain from the relationship than does Asia.
Japan-US trade is a proxy for countries elsewhere in the region and illustrates how the relationship between equity and currency markets and US-Asia trade has broken down since the financial crisis. For example, the relationship between Japanese and US trade was positively correlated with the Nikkei until July 2009. Although exports from Japan to the US continued to grow until September 2011, the correlation turned negative after that point and is particularly marked since the beginning of 2013, ironically, the start of President Abeâs tenure, as illustrated in Figure 1. While overall the correlation is negative at -0.55, much of this is accounted for by the post-crisis period.
Figure 1 | Value of Japanese exports to the United States, June 2001-Dec 2014 (USDm) vs Nikkei Last Price Monthly, June 2001-March 2014
Figure 1 SourceÂ |Â DeltaMetrics 2014
Similarly, as with other economies in the region, there is also a weak, but negative correlation between Japanâs exports to the US and the value of the Yen against the USD (Figure 2).
Figure 2 | Value of Japanâs exports to the US, June 2001-Dec 2014, USDm vs Yen per US Dollar, Last Price Monthly, June 2001-March 2014
Figure 2 SourceÂ |Â DeltaMetrics 2014
Again, the most marked post-crisis turning point in the relationship between exports to the US and the value of the Yen is at the start of Abenomics where the Yen has been depreciating against the dollar. This cannot be seen as anything to do with trade HGH since it is a deliberate policy choice, and the correlation, -0.29, reflects that. However, what is very clear from Figure 2 is that the currency depreciation is not having a marked effect on increasing exports to the US.
And again like other countries in the Asia-Pacific region, Japan is heavily dependent on intra-regional trade: some seven out of ten of its top export destinations are within the region. The correlation between Japanâs terms of trade (the value of exports in relation to the value of imports) and the value of its currency against the dollar is positive at 0.79 suggesting that the depreciation of the Yen is likely to be important in shoring up the value of its exports more generally.
Figure 3 | Japanâs terms of trade (value of exports/value of imports), June 2001-Dec 2014 vs JPY per US Dollar, Last Price Monthly, June 2001-March 2014
Figure 3 SourceÂ |Â DeltaMetrics 2014
These negative correlations between trade and equity and currency markets are replicated across the region. Indian trade with China is negatively correlated with the value of the Rupee against the US Dollar, for example. But this should not be a surprise. Much of Asia is still emerging and all of Asia-Pacific is heavily dependent on trade with itself. The structure of trade is, even between advanced economies within the region and less advanced economies, dominated by commodities and intermediate manufacturing; the equity and currency values, in contrast, have been heavily driven by speculation in the post crisis period and while South-South trade remains set to grow by just 5.3% over the next year it will be some time before this type of hubris resumes (Figure 4).
Figure 4 | USDbn value of North-North and South-South trade, June 2001-Dec 2015
Figure 4 Source | DeltaMetrics 2014
Neither the US nor Asia can afford to leave the negotiations in limbo, not just because of the importance of export-led growth in a sustainable global recovery. There are two reasons for this. First, an FTA in the Asia-Pacific region that extends beyond the South-East Asian nations (already represented through ASEAN) wouldÂ create advantages from the reduction of costs of trade between nations and potentially help to shore up theÂ south-south trade that was so much a feature of post-crisis recovery but that has waned since.
But second, the US would become a minority trading bloc accounting for just under 12% of world tradeÂ compared to the nearly 35% of world trade that the Asia-Pacific region accounts for and the just over 34%Â that the European Union accounts for including intra-regional trade. In the end, by leaving Asia without a tradeÂ deal, the US has weakened rather than strengthened its position: China is currently excluded from TPP but isÂ critical to its trade structure. There is, potentially, more scope for an agreement between all nations in the regionÂ including China than there is between the region and the US if the US does not take a pragmatic approach toÂ negotiations. President Obama and his team should be thinking about trade returns in every sense.