Webcast 024 | Is global economics more important than geopolitics?

As we move into the final quarter of 2014 it’s time to take stock on what has been a disappointing year in many ways. Neither trade nor economic growth have been anywhere near as robust as many economists expected at the beginning of the year, and the final quarter of 2014 looks like it will be tougher rather than easier. Delta Economics is pretty bearish about the immediate future but are we missing some of the key economic facts that may make the picture look brighter?

Discussing this topic with Dr. Rebecca Harding and to sift fact from fiction is Dr. Andrew Sentance, Senior Economist Advisor of PwC and former Monetary Policy Committee member.


Webcast 024 Author  |  Rebecca Harding  |  CEO

Own Goal?

Why Brazil needed to think beyond winning the World Cup on home turf  |  That Brazil might not be in the World Cup final on July 13th is to many Brazilians and football pundits around the world unthinkable. It is a shame that similar confidence cannot be applied to the Brazilian preparations for the World Cup or, indeed to the Brazilian economy more generally. Brazil, in the words of a German trade agency official, is the country that is “always going to promise growth just around the corner”.

Take Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) as an example. Since its peak in 2008 to the end of 2014, Delta Economics anticipates that it will have grown by just under 20% in nominal value terms despite the World Cup, the need for infrastructure around newly found oil reserves and the promises of a Latin American automotive hub. This includes a drop of 45% between 2008 and 2009, a subsequent 66% recovery and then growth of just 0.6% in 2012. Delta Economics anticipates that the forecast 6.8% growth in FDI this year will be nearly 1% lower than growth in 2013. Combined with flatter growth, high inflation and high interest rates, it is small wonder that the failure of the economy to deliver growth has frustrated investors as much as the failure of the World Cup to delivery prosperity has frustrated people.

The reason why interest rates are so high is not just to keep inflation under control, it is also to keep the value of the Real from tumbling. The Real-USD spot price is negatively correlated (-0.69) with Brazil’s total trade: after all, Brazil’s potential is defined by its capacity to become the Latin American growth engine with both natural resources, energy and manufacturing capacity to fuel its trade surplus (Figure 1).



Figure 1  |  Brazil’s total trade (USDm) June 2001-April 2015 vs Real per USD, Last Price Monthly, June 2001- April 2014

Source  |  DeltaMetrics 2014, Bloomberg


Except for the period during the financial crisis the value of the Real rose with trade consistently to the middle of 2011 but has slipped back against the US Dollar since then. Trade has similarly slipped back since then. What this suggests is that the currency is driven by increases in trade because investors see this as a route to growth in the economy and therefore returns. The currency itself has not necessarily influenced trade itself: as the currency has strengthed, so has trade, although, as a surplus nation, it might be expected that Brazil’s exports in particular would drop of with a strengthening currency.

By way of confirmation that there is a large speculative element in Brazil’s currency valuation, its Terms of Trade are not particular correlated with the value of the Real (Figure 2), but they are highly correlated with the oil price (0.89).



Figure 2  |  Brazil’s terms of trade (value of exports in terms of the value of imports), June 2001-April 2015, vs Real per USD, Last Price Monthly, June 2001-April 2014

Source  |  DeltaMetrics 2014, Bloomberg


What this suggests is that neither export nor import growth is particularly influenced by the value of the currency. This is because of the strong speculative element to the value of the Real which means that investment has little connection with the economic fundamentals in the economy – only its potential. The correlation with the oil price is unsurprising because it simply reflects the dominance of oil in Brazil’s trade structure.

And this structure of trade has changed little over the last 12 years. The Finger-Kreinin Index (FKI), which compares the structure of trade in one country against others, suggests that while other BRIC countries have become more like Brazil, Brazil itself has failed to capitalise on its manufacturing potential seen a decade ago in its car sector.

In the context of an imminent World Cup tournament, the irony that the Brazilian car sector is dominated by German manufacturers is not lost. As Figures 3 and 4 show, Brazil’s exports to Germany are most strongly correlated with the value of the Real of all its top five export partners. This is simple to explain: exports to the Netherlands are largely in oil, to the US are in Maize and Oil, to Japan in iron ore and oil and to China in iron ore, oil and soya.



Figure 3  |  Correlation of Brazil’s exports to its top five export partners with Real per USD, Last Price Monthly, June 2001-April 2014

Source  |  Delta Economics analysis


Why should exports to Germany be more correlated with the value of the Real (Figure 4)? Perhaps it is because of the potential in that trade relationship: inward investment from German manufacturers has promised much for Brazil: innovative automotive production plants with a strong supply of automotive components from Argentina were regarded as the engine of a competitive nation that could move from being highly commodity dependent to one that could skip the intermediate manufacturing seen in other BRICs and focus on high-end automotives. Anticipating the



Figure 4  |  Value of Brazil’s exports to Germany (USDm), June 2001-April 2015 vs Real per USD, Last Price Monthly, June 2001-April 2014

Source  |  DeltaMetrics 2014, Bloomberg


But Germany is Brazil’s fifth largest export destination and although the relationship has promised much, reflected in the high correlation it has disappointed investors, hence the pressure on the Real now.

Brazil is an increasingly open economy with trade anticipated to account for 46% of GDP in 2014 rising to 52% in 2018. However, this reflects two things in our forecast: flatter projected GDP and the dominance of commodities in its structure of exports in particular (Figure 5). While there is evidence that Brazilians are increasingly demanding more sophisticated products (automotive imports are forecast to grow 14% in 2014 while bio-pharmaceuticals are forecast to grow by nearly 12%, for example), the fact that two of the fastest growing import sectors are printing and ancillary machinery and telephone equipment suggests that infrastructures are still growing at catch-up rates.


Click to view larger version

Figure 5  |  Where is the infrastructure?

Source  |  DeltaMetrics 2014


If Germany is the country amongst Brazil’s top importers that has the most to offer in terms of higher end export potential then Figure 5 also presents a more worrying picture. The fastest growing import sectors from Germany into Brazil do not reflect infrastructure development, but do reflect greater consumer demand for telephones, air-conditioning, medicines and medical equipment. The largest import sectors from Germany are similar: cars, medicines, car parts, fertilisers and biopharmaceuticals. Out of the fastest growing import sectors from Germany, the ones most correlated with infrastructure rank 25-30: pumps, car parts, machinery related to rubber and plastic processing, lifting & handling machinery and internal combustion engines.

It is not the place of an economist to predict who is going to be in the World Cup final, still less to predict might win it. But consensus (measured through the odds) of a Brazil-Germany final is not out of the question. Brazil must hope that, if this happens, it can avoid the own goals that have plagued the infrastructure and trade development since it was announced as the host nation for the 2014 tournament.

A dose of its own medicine

Why India has a clear way of boosting its economy through exports  |  When Mr. Modi takes office on the 21st May, his first thoughts will almost certainly not turn to US pharmaceutical imports, but maybe they should. India has been plagued by a trade deficit since 2006 which is likely to grow in double digits this year and next. Alongside this, its terms of trade (the value of its exports in relation to the value of its imports) have deteriorated substantially and although its share of world trade increased to above 2.5% in 2013 and is forecast to reach 3% by 2015, this is as much because of increases in imports as it is about increases in exports. The Rupee’s value against the US Dollar has slipped by over a third in the three years since May 2011 when confidence in emerging markets generally and India in particular was so strong but if Mr. Modi is to address some of the broader challenges he faces, then it is the link between trade, real economy and key indicators such as the value of the Rupee that he needs to tackle first.

This will not be a simple job because, at the moment, the speculative element in Indian markets and the dominance of its trade by imports means that the correlation between the currency and exports is relatively weak at 0.50. The correlation is slightly stronger between its imports and the value of its currency at 0.53, as shown in Figure 1, which illustrates something unusual about the relationship: as the currency becomes weaker, imports drop.


Figure 1  |  Indian imports (USDm value, June 2001-April 2015)
against Rupees per USD, Last Price Monthly, June 2001- April 2014
Source  |  DeltaMetrics 2014, Bloomberg


India imports predominantly crude oil, which, with an estimated value of USD 175bn in 2014, is nearly three times higher than the next largest import – gold. If the currency devalues, then exports should become more competitive and imports less competitive since they are more expensive. India has increased its imports of oil over the time since 2006 by over 350% against a backdrop of a depreciating currency making it inflation-prone.

But this relationship also demonstrates the fact that India’s currency is prone to speculation. The correlation is weak against commodity exports and this suggests that it is not so much measuring the economic development and growth of the Indian economy as it is measuring the capacity of the economy to soak up imports from overseas. The Indian stock market is a measure of the investment potential of the Indian economy and it too is more strongly correlated with imports (0.91) than it is with exports (0.90), as illustrated in Figure 2.


Figure 2  |  Indian imports (USDm value, June 2001-April 2015) vs IndiaBSE, Last Price Monthly, June 2001-April 2014
Source  |  DeltaMetrics 2014, Bloomberg


While the difference in the correlation between the BSE and exports and imports is marginal, it points to the fact that investors are, arguably, measuring the success of the economy against their own capacity to invest in it. The post-dotcom hubris that surrounded India’s development in the early 2000’s spawned an excitement about India’s potential growth that fuelled inward investments in biotechnology, pharmaceuticals and electronics from developed world economies, particularly the United States. And yet, paradoxically perhaps, India’s trade itself has shifted markedly away from the developed world economies and towards economies in the Middle East and Asia.



Figure 3  |  Moving focus – how India’s trade is shifting from Europe to Asia and the Middle East
Source  |  DeltaMetrics 2014


For example, China was India’s twelfth largest export destination in 2001 but is its third largest now and Singapore was its eleventh but fourth largest now. The UK was India’s fourth largest export destination but is now 7th and Germany its fifth, but is now 8th. India’s fastest growing export destinations are Indonesia, Vietnam and Brazil and while the UAE has risen from second to first, much of this is because of exports of diamonds, jewellery and gold.

Its import structure has changed as well, reflecting India’s insatiable demand for oil, diamonds, gold and jewellery. In 2001 the UAE was ranked 14th and Saudia Arabia are nexus pheromones any good 18th. They are now 2nd and 3rd respectively. China is the number one importer and with import values into India of USD 71.9bn anticipated in 2014, its imports are worth more than twice those from Switzerland and the United States which ranked first and second in 2001.

Trade is normally glacial in the pace at which it changes so these shifts in the structure of India’s trade partners are worth dwelling on. The pattern that is being reflected is a shift away from the developed world towards the emerging world and while this is, in itself, not a bad thing, it pushes India’s trade structure increasingly towards that of an emerging economy. Its trade is heavily concentrated in refined oil (nearly 19% of its exports) and pearls, precious stones, precious metals and jewellery (16%). Pharmaceuticals overall account for around 3% and while this is more than its concentration ratio of 2.5% in 2001, it is modest in comparison to its commodity exports.

Exports to the emerging economies are largely commodity-based: for example, exports to Vietnam are dominated by beef and soyabean cakes, maize and fish while exports to Brazil are oil, synthetic filament thread (used to stitch car seats), carbon and coke and insecticides. Yet to Germany, its top five export sectors include aircraft parts and cars, while to the US they include medicines.

It would be a mistake for policy makers to ignore the importance of traditional areas of export strength. Precious metal, pearl and jewellery exports to the UAE, for example are strongly correlated with the value of the currency at 0.61, as shown in Figure 4.


Figure 4  |  Exports of pearls, precious stones, precious metals and jewellery (USDm) to the UAE,
June 2001-April 2015 against Rupees per USD, June 2001-April 2014, Last Price Monthly

Source  |  DeltaMetrics 2014, Bloomberg


It would also be misguided to ignore the importance of emerging markets in Asia. As Figure 5 shows, there is a very strong correlation (0.91) between the value of India’s Iron Ore exports to China and the Indian Stock Exchange.


Figure 5  |  Indian exports of ores, slag and ash to China (USDm value, June 2001-April 2015)
vs IndiaBSE, Last Price Monthly, June 2001-April 2014
Source  |  DeltaMetrics 2014, Bloomberg


Indian pharmaceutical exports to the United States, however, are almost as highly correlated with the BSE at 0.88 and this is important for policy makers. Over the period since 2001, the comparative advantage of Indian pharmaceuticals has gone from positive to negative and while the comparative disadvantage of Indian electronics exports (measured through revealed comparative advantage) has gone from -0.66 to -0.46, given the powerhouse that is India’s innovation economy, this should be reflected in its electronics exports as well. Yet the correlation between India’s trade and proxies for its innovation (the amount the government spends on R&D and business expenditure on R&D) are very high at over 0.93 as are skills, wages and foreign direct investment. More than this, the currency elasticity of trade is 0.99 correlated with trade.

All of this gives Mr. Modi’s team a clear lever to stimulate the economy. First, in the short term, the currency should be kept weak – this will have the effect of closing the trade deficit simply because the responsiveness of trade to changes in the currency is so high. This will promote exports in areas where price competitiveness is key, such as oil or iron ore, or even beef, which is a fast growing export product.

Second, India’s new government needs to think about its long term growth which will only come from extending education into rural communities, building on its high level skills base in cities and innovation – building on its successes in software and business services as well as in pharmaceuticals. South-South trade between emerging economies is commodity and infrastructure focuses and Delta Economics is not positive about its pace of growth in the immediate future. Accordingly, as the developed world begins to emerge from the financial crisis, India needs to take a dose of its own medicine to re-connect with these markets as they will help it to restore its competitive advantage in the innovative sectors that were so vibrant ten years ago.

Latin America

Latin America’s export trade is growing but the drop in the forecast is a function of declines the outlook for trade in 2014 compared to 2013. In particular, the forecast for Brazil in 2014 is 7.5% compared to growth of 8.6% in 2013 and for countries like Peru the drop is even larger, from 8.5% to 6.5% growth. The region is currently prone to political instability and the slow down in exports is a function of this alongside restrictive import policies that have been followed through by some countries, like Argentina. As a result, imports are also forecast to drop. There are two drivers of Latin American trade: demand for copper and oil in emerging Asia in particular and its role in global supply chains. If China’s slowdown becomes a hard-landing, copper exports to China from Brazil and Peru in particular will be threatened and this in itself can explain the drop in the forecast. However, the uncertainty in markets, particularly recently triggered by Venezuela’s decision to halt economic relations with Panama and by Argentina’s economic mismanagement, has also caused our forecast to be downgraded rapidly over the past few months, from 7.2% in our Q4 2013 forecast to 3.6% now.

Shoring-up growth

The trade messages for the UK Chancellor’s budget | The UK Chancellor of the Exchequer, George Osborne, will stand up to make his budget speech against a backdrop of fragile growth and geo-political and economic risk. He can celebrate the fact that the UK has the fastest growth rate in the G7, that there is some evidence of businesses starting to invest and that the Purchasing Manager Index surveys for the UK have suggested that output is remaining in positive territory. But he should also be wary: the crisis in the Ukraine has unsettled markets and Russian investors in London alike; despite efforts to promote long term competitiveness and growth through exports, UK export growth has remained stubbornly low and apparently resilient to the near 25% devaluation of Sterling against the Euro and against the Dollar. And the UK’s output overall still remains below its pre-crisis levels according to the Bank of England.

Promoting trade is one of the UK government’s policy tools for securing long-term growth. UK Trade and Investment supports exporters and there is an export guarantee scheme that runs in partnership with the commercial banks to allow exporters access to trade finance when entering new markets. There is some evidence that the Trade Ratio (exports divided by imports) is improving slightly (Figure 1) but this is as much due to falling imports as it is to do with any marked improvement in exports.



Figure 1 | UK Exports, Imports and Trade Ratio (X/M), June 2001-January 2014

Source | DeltaMetrics 2014


Two things are noticeable from this chart, which is shows trade in nominal value US dollar terms up to the end of January 2014. First, export and import trade growth has been very flat since the end of 2011 which marked the end of the post-crisis trade recovery. Second, the UK trade ratio has declined from 0.84 in June 2001 to 0.71 in January 2014, which explains the deterioration in the UK’s trade deficit over that time. The most marked declines in the ratio were pre-crisis with a trough reached in April 2007. The crisis appeared to hit exports less than imports up to the end of Q1 2011 but the ratio fell sharply between February 2011 and March 2012 caused largely by a slower decline over that period in imports relative to exports.

This does not appear to have much to with the value of Sterling, however, as Figures 2a and 2b demonstrate. Over the whole period, the value of Sterling weakened slightly against the US Dollar and the Euro but arguably insufficiently to explain the size of the change in the trade ratio.



Figure 2a | UK Trade Ratio (X/M) vs GBP per USD June 2001-January 2014

Source | DeltaMetrics 2014, Bloomberg


Figure 2b | UK Trade Ratio (X/M) vs Euro per GBP June 2001-January 2014

Source | DeltaMetrics 2014, Bloomberg

Mark Carney, who was widely expected to preside over further currency devaluation has actually seen the currency increase, but the impact appears to have been the opposite of what might have been expected: the trade ratio has improved: exports have become slightly stronger despite a strengthening currency.

As noted in a previous Trade View, the UK does seem to be A Case Apart in terms of the relationship between its trade and its currency. Some of this is because of the role UK corporates play in global supply chains and this is evidenced by our trade with China and Brazil in particular, illustrated in Figure 3.



Figure 3 | UK Exports to BRICs, June 2001-January 2014 USDm

Source | DeltaMetrics 2014


UK automotive exports to China, Brazil and India have been increasing since June 2012. This was the date when BMW invested in its UK production facilities and this has been further supported by subsequent investment from Jaguar Land Rover as well. Alongside this, UK exports to Germany of cars have declined suggesting that the BMW investment, in particular, was deliberate policy to export the Mini from the UK to China. The UK’s automotive trade with China was less than its automotive trade with Germany up until 2013 but has now taken over as the largest partner for this sector.

There is a danger in over-promoting both exports to China and the car sector as models of how the UK is driving export-led growth, however. Figure 4 shows that UK car exports are forecast to fall over the next year and while this is part of a wider global forecast downturn, it is likely to have an impact on our trade ratio as one of three major export sectors which may struggle during 2014.



Figure 4 | Exports and Forecast Export Growth for Key Products

Source | DeltaMetrics 2014


Gone are the days when UK Chancellors stand up to give their budget speeches with a glass of whisky in their hands, yet the Chancellor may want to celebrate the growth in exports of the UK liqueur and spirits sector. But as he ponders what to do to support UK PLC, it is clear that he needs to support UK exporters generally and productivity and competitiveness in particular as trade across the world fails to deliver growth in the way that it has done in the past.



Figure 5 | UK Imports and Exports vs FTSE 100 Last Price Monthly, June 2001-January 2014

Source | DeltaMetrics 2014, Bloomberg

He may also like to ponder this: the government was elected on the basis of a promise to maintain the UK’s triple A rating by bringing down its budget deficit. While short-term financial stringency is important, the only long-term route to bring down a budget deficit is to ensure long-term growth through competitiveness and exports are a key part of this.

The service sector is growing and yet merchandise trade remains highly correlated with the FTSE 100 index, as shown in Figure 5. With exceptions at the beginning of the time series and in September 2011, trade and the FTSE have largely moved together. Financial markets are entering into Q2 2014 in a febrile state, wary of geo-politics, deflation in Europe and of Dollar denominated debt in Asia, all of which will dampen the UK trade growth forecast for this year. Against this backdrop, the UK Chancellor has no option but to support long term growth through competitiveness and trade. Measures to extend Export Finance Guarantees and promote innovation, especially in engineering and pharmaceuticals can only help to shore up aerospace, automotive and pharmaceutical exports and the role of UK exporters in global supply chains. It may even further help strengthen the UK’s equity markets.

Don’t Cry for Me…

Why trade mistakes are hampering Latin American growth | In the context of the current Ukrainian crisis, the decision by Venezuela’s President, Nicolas Maduro, to suspend diplomatic and economic relations with Panama has barely registered. Trade between Panama and Venezuela is relatively small, worth an estimated US$ 1.2bn in 2013. Crude oil, which is Venezuela’s main export with a value of over US$ 2.6bn is not within the top 30 trade sectors between the two countries and therefore, on the face of it, the impact on long term policies to stabilise the Venezuelan economy may be minimal. Trade is highly volatile between Venezuela and Panama and Venezuela is more reliant on its trade with Panama for imports than it is for exports, as Figure 1 shows.



Figure 1 | Estimated exports from Venezuela to Panama and imports to Venezuela from Panama, 2001-2014

Source | DeltaMetrics 2014

(Trade data between Venezuela and Panama contain a large number of zeroes thus data must be seen as indicative)


Second, and as Figure 1 also shows, the decision to stop trade with Panama potentially hurts Panama more than it hurts Venezuela. Venezuela was Panama’s largest export partner in 2013, although the US will take over from Venezuela during 2014. This calculation is ill-advised on several counts. For example, Venezuela relies heavily on the US for its oil exports. It is the US’s third largest importer of crude oil; it’s exports to the US of crude oil are ten times higher than for the second largest export partner – Germany. With inflation running at, reportedly, above 50% and with the fiscal deficit running at 16% of GDP, the country needs stability more than anything. Any tension with Panama has the potential to spill over into relations with the US and thereby affect its oil exports. The parallels with Ukraine’s situation are not drawn idly: street protests leading to a new government and increasing tensions with the US pose a risk of sanctions and this would not help Venezuela’s quest for sustainable economic growth.

Second, Venezuela is not amongst Latin America’s top 30 trade partners, and yet it is highly dependent on the region for its trade. As Panama’s canal grows so too will its trade both with Latin America, North America, the Middle East and with Asia-Pacific. Its port-to-port trade with, say Singapore is forecast to grow by 10% in 2014 alone and with Hong Kong by 8%. Any greater political instability in Venezuela will have the effect of destabilising trade between other countries in the region. We are already forecasting substantial drops in the trade between it and many of the Latin American countries and yet it has the scope to act as a trade route through to North America if it keeps its export routes with Panama open.



Figure 2 | Venezuela’s export trade with Latin American countries (2014 values and change on 2013) compared to Panama’s extra regional growth.

Source | DeltaMetrics 2014


The fact that its largest export product through Panama is automotives demonstrates how important this trade route is potentially in integrating Latin American and North American non-oil supply chains. Before the lock-down of trade we were expecting Venezuelan exports of cars to Panama to increase by over 18% this year, albeit from a small base.

Venezuela’s exports to Argentina are forecast to grow by over 9% during 2014 but Venezuela would do well to learn from Argentina’s trade track record, especially on restricting trade with other countries. Argentina imposed punitive tariffs on importers in 2011 requiring them to export from Argentina the amount in value terms that they were importing. The effect on trade for Argentina has been to increase export and import volatility since, as illustrated in Figure 3.


Figure 3 | Argentinian exports and imports, June 2001-February 2014

Source | DeltaMetrics 2014

Since mid-2011 when the first range of additional tariffs were imposed, Argentina’s trade has experienced greater volatility in its trade and in fact, trade seems set on a downward trend. The seasonal swings in trade, which were already greater than pre-financial crisis appear to have been accentuated in the years since with a particularly severe drop in 2011-12 as the tariffs started to take effect.

While Venezuela has not introduced tariffs, it has just suspended its trade with Panama, the lessons from Argentina in terms of regional contagion cannot be understated. Figure 4 is the same chart, Argentinian exports and imports, against the value of the Brazilian Real and shows clearly that the value of the Real in relation to the USD has deteriorated over the same time period.


Figure 4 | Risk of contagion: Argentina’s trade against the Real per USD exchange rate 2001-2014

Source | DeltaMetrics 2014, Bloomberg

It would be a mistake to say that Argentinian, or even Venezuelan trade directly causes a depreciation of the Real or other regional currencies. However, what Argentina’s economic and trade strategies have done, like other countries in the region, is make markets call into question the robustness and sustainability of economic performance and therefore to make them more bearish on the overall outlook as the collapse in the Peso and its knock-on effects to other Emerging Market currencies in January showed.

Venezuela’s trade is important to the region because of the link with the US and although they are not currently through Panama itself, the risk to that trade comes from geo-politics rather than trade economics. If it continues to suspend trade, then the US may impose restrictions on its imports. This could increase the downside risks to Venezuela’s trade forecast for 2014 and there is a clear risk for further contagion across the region. Perhaps like the Ukraine, this is a crisis that may start small but escalate to something bigger, particularly in economic terms. When it does, remember the lessons from Argentina, and don’t cry for me…..

Webcast 005 | Europe’s re-discovered growth

Dr Rebecca Harding argues in this webcast that Europe’s long term growth will be driven by its global supply chains and it is time for policy makers to focus policy on competitiveness as this is critical to Europe’s future. Europe’s car sector exports, for example, accounts for nearly 50% of world exports and the supply chain that supports this is woven into the fabric of intra-European trade as well as its trade with emerging economies. Through its key sector supply chains, cars, pharmaceuticals and hi-tech electronic products for example, Europe’s industrial strength will help to correct internal balances as well as drive trade globally. Exports to Brazil will grow by 5.2% in 2014, to China by 7% and to India by 3% despite relatively flat growth within Europe in 2014. This will ensure that recovery is sustained.


Webcast 005 Author  |  Rebecca Harding  |  CEO